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ABSTRACT
As recent incidents have shown, weak passwords are a severe
security risk for authenticating users and granting access to
protected resources. Additionally, strong passwords score
low on usability, especially on mobile devices. In this work,
we present SmartAuth, a scalable context-aware authentica-
tion framework built on top of OpenAM, a state-of-practice
identity and access management suite. It uses adaptive and
dynamic context fingerprinting based on Hoeffding trees to
continuously ascertain whether a user’s identity is authen-
tic or not, and it respects privacy preferences by adopting
consent-driven use of context information. We assess our
approach from both an offensive and defensive security per-
spective. Our results show that dynamic context fingerprint-
ing has good potential for a zero-interaction authentication
scheme, with a minimal performance overhead compared to
traditional authentication schemes.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—
Information flow controls; K.6.5 [Management of Com-
puting and Information Systems]: Security and Protec-
tion—Unauthorized access; D.2.8 [Software Engineering]:
Metrics—complexity measures, performance measures
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1. INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of identity and access management
(IAM) platforms is to address authentication, authorization,
access and auditing as a common concern for online ser-
vice providers. The added value that many state-of-practice
identity management solutions have to offer is their capa-
bility of federated single sign on (SSO), simplifying access
to partnering services with a single login. However, given
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today’s evolving threat landscape and recent attacks on on-
line services, poor passwords have been shown over and over
again to be a severe security threat [6]. Verizon’s 2013 Data
Breach Investigations Report [25] confirms that weak or de-
fault passwords, and stolen or reused credentials are still the
main source of successful data breaches. Hence, traditional
systems for identity and access management technologies
that heavily rely on passwords no longer suffice. Indeed, the
mainstream pin or username and password-based authenti-
cation combined with the long-lived user authenticated ses-
sions do not offer the security guarantees for risk-sensitive
services that require stronger continuous identity assurance.
Furthermore, usernames and passwords are deemed incon-
venient for mobile customers, and smartcard based authen-
tication solutions − as in online banking applications −
cause a skewed balance between security and usability, espe-
cially for online applications where a frictionless experience
is paramount.
To address these concerns and trade-offs, we investigate
reliable and less intrusive authentication techniques that can
operate silently in the background based on additional con-
text and behavioural information [24]. Continuous passive
assessment of the login context through frictionless zero-
interaction authentication [7] enables service providers to
streamline access for trusted combinations of user accounts
and consumer contexts. By leveraging information about
device characteristics, time and location, etc. during authen-
tication, we aim to leverage context to quantify the risk in
zero-interaction user authentication, and reduce the risk of
fraudulent activities through analysis of significant contex-
tual deviations over time.
From a practical point of view, collecting context infor-
mation for enhanced risk-based authentication raises sev-
eral privacy concerns. To address this challenge, we specif-
ically investigate context fingerprint-based authentication
with minimal information disclosure, and techniques that
require explicit consent on an individual basis about which
context properties can be used for enhanced authentication.
SmartAuth, our approach for dynamic and adaptive con-
text fingerprinting for continuous user authentication, uses
Hoeffding trees [9] − a learning and mining technique for
high-speed data streams− to continuously classify user iden-
tities and implement change detection. We use this tech-
nique to continuously assess the risk of fraudulent activities
during long-lived user authenticated sessions. To address
privacy concerns while collecting user context, our solution
dynamically adapts to user consents. We share our expe-
rience with enhancing OpenAM1 − a state-of-the-art open
source federated identity and access management solution
− for the implementation and validation of our work. The
main contribution of this work is twofold:
• A user consent-driven probabilistic and adaptive au-
thentication method to identify suspicious actions
• A scalable implementation on top of a state-of-practice
identity and access management platform
After reviewing related work in section 2, we present our
dynamic context fingerprinting method in section 3. The
actual implementation on top of OpenAM is discussed in
section 4. In section 5 we evaluate its performance, as well
as the strengths and weaknesses of our implementation. We
conclude in section 6 summarizing the main insights and
identifying possible topics for future work.
2. RELATED WORK
Weak passwords [15] are a major cause of data and secu-
rity breaches. SplashData reveals each year its annual 25
Worst Passwords of the Year list2. The top 3 most common
passwords of 2013 were 123456, password, and 12345678,
and these were also in the top 3 of the list of 2012 and 2011.
SplashData compiles their top 25 based on files with millions
of stolen passwords posted online by hackers. With dictio-
nary attacks and optimized password cracking tools, users
with simple or short (i.e. less than 8 characters) passwords
are easy prey, especially if they use the same password for
various services.
Efforts are ongoing to replace password-based authentica-
tion with better alternatives [1, 3, 11, 12]. With multi-factor
authentication, users authenticate with a combination of au-
thentication factors, i.e. knowledge, biometrics, and posses-
sion. A common example of two-factor authentication is
accessing an ATM machine, where the credit card is some-
thing that you have, and the PIN code is something that
you know. Knowledge-based factors include passwords, PIN
codes and security questions. The advantage is that they
do not need any equipment, but they are easily guessed,
the user can be tricked into handing them to an attacker
(i.e. phishing or social engineering), and complex passwords
can be forgotten. Biometric factors like voice recognition,
fingerprints or retina scans cannot be forgotten, but may re-
quire expensive equipment to implement. Possession factors
like ownership of digital certificates, smart cards, USB to-
kens, or One Time Password generators are more resistant
to guessing, but the hardware can be costly (e.g., in the case
of tokens and smart cards), as can the process to implement
it (e.g., in the case of certificate management. Addition-
ally, possession factors can also be lost or stolen. Cost and
ease-of-use, especially on mobiles, are two main reasons why
such alternatives are still fighting an uphill battle to elevate
authentication to the next level of protection.
Contemporary multifactor authentication schemes do aug-
ment security, but are often considered as cumbersome with
a high impact on user experience. We need a passive as-
sessment of user context through frictionless multi-factor
authentication to reduce this inconvenience. Early works
1http://forgerock.com/products/open-identity-
stack/openam/
2http://splashdata.com/press/worstpasswords2013.htm
leveraged location- and proximity-based authentication [8,
16] to simplify and improve security. Nowadays, any con-
text of the user [5, 13] is being considered for new types
of online authentication and stronger continuous identity
assurance. Bruce Schneier, an expert authority on secu-
rity, commented on risk-based authentication as recently as
November 2013 [23]:
I like this idea of giving each individual login attempt a risk
score, based on the characteristics of the attempt: The risk
score estimates the risk associated with a log-in attempt based
on a user’s typical log-in and usage profile, taking into ac-
count their device and geographic location, the system they’re
trying to access, the time of day they typically log in, their
device’s IP address, and even their typing speed ...
Browser fingerprinting schemes [10, 19] have been widely
used to uniquely identify individuals for tracking purposes,
but the same techniques can be applied for strengthening
user authentication as well. In a Gartner 2013 report [14],
Henry states that endpoint trustworthiness is especially an
issue for bring-your-own-device (BYOD) scenarios. How-
ever, it is important to decide how much to trust the user
and the contextual information that they are presenting.
The quality of the used context information is key to objec-
tively quantify the risk in zero-interaction authentication [7].
Manzoor et al. [18] argued on the importance of Quality
of Context (QoC) for real-life applications, and presented
QoC models to make effective use of context. However, cur-
rent approaches often rely on ad hoc weighing functions to
aggregate different types of context. There is no system-
atic approach to derive trust levels from the context and the
quality of the context, nor to assess the required accuracy,
precision and recency to reliably ascertain the risk in zero-
interaction [7] or context-based user authentication [13].
Privacy and context are two intimately related [20] and
often conflicting concerns. Chabridon et al. [4] survey exist-
ing works on the notions of privacy and QoC, and confirm
that current solutions usually consider only one notion, and
very few of them started to bridge privacy and QoC. In-
deed, contemporary risk-based authentication systems have
no support for end-user capabilities to provide explicit con-
sent about which personal or transactional context is col-
lected and used, nor are they able to quantify the risk in a
personalized manner.
From a state-of-practice point of view, contemporary risk-
based authentication systems rely on blacklists of IP ad-
dresses of malicious hosts (e.g. botnets), or leverage limited
forms of geolocation (timezones or IPv4 databases to link
addresses with locations) to restrict access. For mobile de-
vices in a local region such databases offer subpar location
quality and accuracy. Also, this technique will become far
more complex when IPv6 is wildly adopted [17] to get an
accuracy comparable to these IPv4 databases.
3. CONTINUOUS IDENTITY ASSURANCE
WITH CONTEXT FINGERPRINTS
The authentication mechanisms discussed so far are static,
i.e. a user can always log in with the same credentials, inde-
pendent of context. Adaptive authentication, on the other
hand, incorporates a risk model per type of interaction with
the system or service. It acknowledges that some situations
are inherently more risky than others, and therefore require
stronger guarantees. As an example, a user checking the
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Figure 1: Context-based identity assurance in a single sign on ecosystem of identity and service providers
news from his trusted mobile device every morning in the
vicinity of Brussels can be considered normal, while clearly
something is odd when the same user makes a purchase from
Russia, ten minutes later. For mobile applications, this risk
model can be based on capabilities like location awareness
(through WiFi, cell-tower triangulation, GPS) and mobile
device identification (device model, language, and screen
size). Anomalies such as locations or devices which are new
to the user are deemed high risk. For payment transactions,
the risk model can analyze time and day of access, typi-
cal transaction amounts, and frequency of payment transac-
tions.
By continuously scrutinizing for deviations from normal
interaction patterns, as depicted in Figure 1, the system
can avoid interrupting the user with more complex authen-
tication schemes up to a point where the system begins to
doubt the person’s identity. In the following subsections, we
will discuss both server-side and client-side fingerprints, and
how we tackle their dynamic behavior at runtime.
3.1 Security requirements for server- and client-
side context fingerprints
The context fingerprint based solution is subject to several
security requirements, which we will list below:
1. Ensure that context fingerprints cannot be compro-
mised
2. Prevent replay attacks of context fingerprints
3. Support revocability of context fingerprints
4. Fingerprints should have strong similarity checks
Our identity and access management solution offers adap-
tive consent-driven intelligence to protect against risk-based
threats. It assesses the risk during authentication based on
a configurable score system, and determines whether to re-
quire the user to complete other authentication steps (such
as HOTP, requiring the user to authenticate with a one-time
password delivered by email or by SMS) when the sum of the
scores exceeds a certain threshold. The scores are based on
both server- and client-side context fingerprints, including
historic IP addresses and ranges, geolocalization, time since
last login, device, software and transaction fingerprints.
Contrary to existing systems, our solution offers 2 en-
hancements to preserve privacy on sharing sensitive context
information: (1) for each context-attribute used for risk-
assessment, the user has to provide consent, and (2) client-
side components apply an efficient similarity preserving hash
function on sensitive context-information rather than send-
ing and storing the context information in the clear.
3.2 Dynamic context fingerprints
As no particular fingerprinting algorithm is universally
better than all the others, combining multiple models gen-
erally offers some kind of performance improvement. We
therefore use a dynamic fingerprinting algorithm that com-
bines many fingerprints into one that is more accurate than
the individual ones.
Furthermore, we also take user consent into consideration
by dynamically adapting and optimizing the weight of mul-
tiple context fingerprints. The proposed approach can be
formulated as follows:
d =
C∑
i=1
wi(x)× h(x,D) (1)
C is the number of context types that can be used for fin-
gerprinting. x is the context value, and h computes a hash
value of this context value and compares it with entries in
its database D. The hash value has two purposes, i.e. (1) it
reduces the amount of data to be stored and communicated,
and (2) it obfuscates sensitive information when sent across
the network. The weights are first initialized according to
user consents, i.e. wi(x) is 0 if the user has not provided
consent to collect and use context parameter i.
We use Hoeffding trees [9], a mining technique for high-
speed data streams, to continuously test and classify adap-
Figure 2: SmartAuth: Dynamic context fingerprinting as an authentication plugin in Forgerock’s OpenAM
tation rules and actions. The added value of using Hoeffding
trees is manifold:
• They operate in a limited amount of memory and time.
• They are ready to predict and classify at any time.
• They support an interleaved test-then-train setting.
During the training phase, our algorithm collects all finger-
prints, and classifies the fingerprint combinations as a posi-
tive or negative training instance depending on whether they
match with the actual authentication of the individual.
During the testing phase, the Hoeffding tree is used to
ascertain whether a given fingerprint will be effective or not
given the possible fingerprints the user granted to be col-
lected. Our solution builds upon Hoeffding trees to make
sure that fingerprints with a negative utility are never used,
and to be able to adapt to concept drift to handle dynami-
cally evolving fingerprints (e.g. current location or browser
version). Hoeffding trees are driven by the Hoeffding bound
 that decides how many instances are needed to achieve a
certain level of confidence on the best attribute to split the
tree.
 =
√
R2ln(1/δ)
2n
(2)
The Hoeffding bound  defines that with probability 1-δ,
the true mean of the real-valued variable r with range R
is at least r¯ − , with n being the number of independent
observations of r. For example, assuming R = 1.0, then for
δ = 0.95 and n = 10 samples,  evaluates to 0.05.
For our work, this means that one context fingerprint is
superior compared to other fingerprints when the difference
of information gain is greater than . The real-valued vari-
able r in our solution is based on the distance function of
the similarity preserving hash function.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
This section covers the implementation of our approach
towards dynamic context fingerprinting for continuous user
authentication.
4.1 Dynamic hash-based context fingerprints
Our current solution combines a variety of fingerprints,
collected from both the user device as well as parameters
collected at server side:
• Client side: language, color depth, screen resolution,
timezone, platform, plugins, etc.
• Server side: IP address range, time of access, geolo-
cation, request headers, etc.
Fingerprints that are collected at client side are hashed so
that these are not sent through the network in the clear. We
apply similarity preserving hash functions like sdhash [22]
and tlsh [21]. The key benefit is that such hash functions
ensure that similar inputs yield similar hash values. The
Hoeffding decision tree implementation is provided by the
Massive Online Analysis (MOA) framework [2].
4.2 Extending OpenAM with a new authenti-
cation module
We implemented the above solution on top of ForgeRock’s
OpenAM version 11.0 by integrating our solution as a new
authentication plugin (see Figure 2), called SmartAuth. Ope-
nAM offers the added value that authentication plugins can
be chained, so that a risk-based assessment of the context
fingerprints can fall back on a stronger authentication method
if need be. This is the case when the collected fingerprints
are not recognized or offer insufficient distinguishing fea-
tures. Depending upon which fingerprints are observed fre-
quently, the Hoeffding classification tree adapts by updating
its optimal splitting attributes.
The context fingerprint also embeds additional fields to
prevent phishing or replay attacks:
• Token: This identifier represents the authenticated
session after initial login. This token can be revoked
by logging out.
• Counter: With each submission of the fingerprint
within a session, this counter is incremented with 1.
This value is compared with the value of the previous
fingerprint stored at server side.
• Timestamp: This field is initialized with a random
value at initial login, and incremented with 1 every
second during the lifetime of the authenticated session.
• Random number: A random number is added to
increase the entropy of the context fingerprint.
• Checksum number: This number is a CRC-32 check-
sum of all the fingerprints and the previous fields.
The fingerprint is sent encrypted from the client to the Smar-
tAuth framework. The receiving party decrypts the mes-
sage, verifies the checksum, the validity of the authentica-
tion token, whether the counter and timecounter is greater
than the last stored value. The timestamp is additionally
used to check whether the timestamp and the time elapsed
since the previously submitted fingerprint (of the same au-
thenticated session) corresponds with the timestamp of the
current fingerprint. If any of these checks fails, the finger-
print is rejected and a fallback to a stronger authentication
method is initiated.
Revisiting the security requirements of section 3.1, we aim
to prevent compromising the fingerprints (1) using public
key encryption, and prevent replay attacks (2) by adding
counters and timestamps to the fingerprints. The Smar-
tAuth authentication framework stores the last received and
valid context fingerprint. These fingerprints are revoked (3)
with every new submission of the fingerprint, and by logging
out hereby invalidating the authentication token.
For each individual, our framework keeps track of the 1024
fingerprints. When the user logs in again, the authentica-
tion token will be different, the counter will be reset, and the
timestamp will be reinitialized. However, the actual finger-
prints are compared with those previously stored. To com-
pare the similarity of the fingerprints (4), the corresponding
hash function should produce exactly the same value or be
within certain limits when using similarity preserving hash
functions.
5. EVALUATION
Contrary to browser fingerprinting techniques like Panop-
ticlick3 that can uniquely identify a browser in more than 1
million entries, our approach allows individuals to selectively
enable and disable context fingerprints. As a result, our ap-
proach will not achieve the same uniqueness rates if fewer
fingerprints are used. However, the Panopticlick method re-
lies on static attributes, whereas our solution supports dy-
namic fingerprinting and can recognize situations where an
individual appears to be at 2 different locations at the same
time by leveraging the similarity preserving hash functions.
To evaluate our methodology, we collected 2000 different
system and connectivity configurations based on 10 differ-
ent types of context fingerprints. These are based on known
and valid combinations of browser user agents, software ver-
sions and device models using the WURFL mobile device
description database4.
In a second stage, we replayed these fingerprints but sim-
ulated time and location variations, and applied similarity
based hash functions on the latter two attributes. The re-
sults are shown in Table 1.
3https://panopticlick.eff.org/
4http://wurfl.sourceforge.net/
# Fingerprints Correct Incorrect
2 63% 37%
4 79% 21%
6 85% 15%
8 91% 9%
10 97% 3%
Table 1: Correct and incorrect classification of indi-
viduals based on their context fingerprints.
In a second experiment, we made the context fingerprint-
ing dynamic. Both the sending and receiving side know
which fingerprints to exchange in a particular context. The
fact whether or not context fingerprints are being commu-
nicated, not only depends on whether the user has given
consent to compute them, but also on other constraints and
preferences the user may wish to impose. The simple exam-
ples below illustrate the adaptive fingerprint is made time
and/or location dependent.
1 if (location ≈ ’work’) {
2 sendFingerPrint(hash(location))
3 sendFingerPrint(hash(screensize))
4 }
5
6 if (time ≈ ’morning’) {
7 sendFingerPrint(hash(time))
8 sendFingerPrint(hash(plugins))
9 }
10
11 ...
Note that the actual values used in the conditions have to be
sent as part of the fingerprints too. When sending the sim-
ilarity preserving hash of the location, the receiving party
can recognize work as the current location, and can infer
that the screensize must be submitted too. If the last one
is missing, or other hashes have been sent, we can identify
a mismatch for this particular individual. In our current
implementation, we manually configured a fixed scheme of
which fingerprints to send under which conditions, but we
hope in the future to revise this approach with a negotia-
tion protocol between the client and server to improve the
usability of this dynamic fingerprinting.
By making the exchange of context fingerprints dynamic,
we add additional differentiating features. We generated
for 10000 users a collection of random context fingerprint
exchange scenarios. The classification accuracy is shown
below in Table 2:
# Fingerprints Correct Incorrect
2 87% 13%
4 91% 9%
6 95% 5%
8 98% 2%
10 99% 1%
Table 2: Correct and incorrect classification of indi-
viduals based on dynamic context fingerprints.
In this adaptive context fingerprinting scenario, we see a
significant improvement in classification accuracy. However,
as the complexity increases, we also measured the perfor-
mance of dynamic context fingerprint on OpenAM in com-
parison with a simple login/password based authentication
scheme.
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Figure 3: Performance of fingerprinting-based au-
thentication
The results in Figure 3 show that there is a performance
penalty of using dynamic context fingerprints for continu-
ous user authentication. Most of the hashes of the context
fingerprints are computed at client side, and as such do not
cause any performance impact on the server. However, our
solution implements continuous authentication where these
fingerprints are repeatedly compared. With a simple login/
password authentication scheme, only the authentication to-
ken received after a first login needs to be verified. This vali-
dation is a very lightweight operation. Additionally, building
upon capabilities of OpenAM and OpenDJ (i.e. the LDAP
backend of OpenAM), we can deploy multiple instances of
our solution to achieve horizontal scalability, with replica-
tion between the LDAP instances to guarantee failover in
case an OpenAM instance goes down, as depicted in Fig-
ure 4 below.
Load Balancer
OpenAM Server 1
OpenDJ 
Configuration Store 1
OpenAM Server 2
OpenDJ 
Configuration Store 2
OpenDJ 
User Store 1
(with fingerprints)
OpenDJ 
User Store 2
(with fingerprints)
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Figure 4: OpenAM scalability with fail-over support
We also carried out a user study with 6 individuals and 9
concrete devices (smartphones and tablets), mainly to test
the SmartAuth framework from a usability point of view and
to compare it with OpenAM’s built-in Device-Print Adap-
tive Authentication module. Similar to our approach, this
module detects the type of device requesting the authen-
tication. However, it is up to the administrator (and not
the user) to enable which features should be part of the
device fingerprint. If there is a mismatch with one of the at-
tributes (user agent, installed fonts, browser plugins, screen
resolution or depth, timezone and geolocation, etc.), a pre-
configured number of penalty points (per attribute) is added
to a global score, and if the total penalty points exceeds a
configured threshold, the user may be asked to verify his
identity with stronger authentication schemes.
When the users were confronted with the facts that (1)
their fingerprints were sent in full (and not hashed), that
(2) users were not able to opt-in or opt-out of which fin-
gerprints were collected, and that (3) the weighted scoring
function is identical for each individual rather than person-
alized, and (4) does not evolve with their login behavior, the
test subjects understood at least at a conceptual level the
added value of the SmartAuth method. However, the test
subjects in this study had mostly a technical background
and the number of participants in this preliminary usabil-
ity assessment was too small to produce results that are
statistically meaningful. Nonetheless, context fingerprints
offer a better user experience compared to traditional logins
and passwords or even multi-factor authentication schemes.
However, similar to biometrics, context fingerprints are not
secrets, and as such they may be easily accessible to hack-
ers. Additionally, some fingerprints are more tightly linked
to the identity than others. Therefore, we recommend to
use context-based authentication as a first level of authen-
tication in a multi-layered risk-based approach, where high
risks require a greater degree of certainty that the identity
is indeed the one user’s claim to be.
6. CONCLUSION
The key contribution of this work is SmartAuth, a flex-
ible and non-intrusive authentication scheme that it offers
increased and adaptive security with support for transpar-
ent authentication, with the ability to authenticate the user
periodically throughout the day in order to maintain confi-
dence in the identity of the user. This authentication scheme
leverages context fingerprints as a key enabler for long-lived
authenticated users and risk-sensitive services.
From a user perspective, SmartAuth delivers ease-of-use
through context-based zero-interaction authentication with
support for end user consent about which contextual infor-
mation attributes are gathered and processed. The main
advantage of contextualizing user authentication and the
ability to detect deviations from normal login behaviour is
that it can be almost impregnable by malicious users who
attempt to get personal details through various intrusion
techniques or by plain theft of a mobile device.
In this work, we demonstrated how such an adaptive au-
thentication system can be incepted on top of OpenAM,
a state-of-practice federated single sign-on solution. After
extending this identity and access management system with
context-based enabling services and concepts, a performance
assessment was carried out to gain insights on the impact of
these incremental security enhancements onto the identity
management system. Our results show that dynamic con-
text fingerprinting has good potential for a zero-interaction
authentication scheme, with a minimal performance over-
head compared to traditional authentication schemes.
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